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ABSTRACT 
I analyze the effects of economic and informational globalization on the diffusion 
of military capabilities in the 20th and 21st centuries. To test these relationships, I use the 
KOF Swiss Economic Institute’s data on economic and informational globalization and 
the Correlates of War data on National Material Capabilities for all states of the 
international system from 1970 to 2011. Using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression of all states with standard errors clustered at the state-level, I find that 
economic globalization negatively correlates with increases in military capabilities; while 
informational globalization positively correlates with increases in military capabilities. 
These findings suggest increases in economic globalization leads states to pursue an 
antithetical approach towards military capabilities, thereby lending support to the 
argument that economic interdependence decreases the likelihood of interstate conflict. 
However, the augmentation of informational globalization appears to validate previous 
arguments which posit that the prevalence of information technology systems is enlarging 
the military capabilities of states.
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................... iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................... v 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................... ix 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................ 6 
The Roots of Globalization .................................................................................. 6 
Economic Interdependence and National Security .............................................. 10 
Measuring Military Capabilities ......................................................................... 14 
The Diffusion of Military Capabilities ................................................................ 22 
Moving the Research Forward............................................................................ 28 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES.................................................................................... 30 
RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................................................................... 35 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION .................................................................................... 43 
Limitations ......................................................................................................... 49 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 51 
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 54 
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 The effect of globalization on military capabilities, 1970-2011. .............. 45 
ix 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CINC Composite Indicator of National Capabilities  
COW Correlates of War 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance  
DCA Defense Cooperation Agreement 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product 
NMC National Material Capabilities 
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs 
 
1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The rise of globalization is widely heralded as one of the most fundamental 
transformations of the 20th and 21st centuries. While the process of globalization is an 
ongoing historical force, the culmination of communication, transportation, and 
technological advances have ushered in more academic attention than at previous points 
in history. Globalization, or the free flow of trade across global markets, has led to a 
myriad of profound changes within the international system. For instance, in 1999 only 
4.0% of the total global population had reliable access to the internet, whereas today that 
number has risen precipitously to 48% (Individuals Using the Internet 2019). 
Telecommunications is another sector of technology that has grown rapidly in the past 
decade; in the United States, 96% of Americans own a cell phone (Demographics of 
Mobile Device Ownership 2019). Some of the world’s largest multinational corporations 
(MNCs) are those which offer internet or telecommunications services. Writing in 1999, 
Kenneth Waltz stated, “one feels that the world has become a smaller one. International 
travel has become faster, easier, and cheaper; music, art, cuisines, and cinema have all 
become cosmopolitan in the world’s major centers and beyond” (1999, 693). A 
significant portion of past research focuses on the impact of globalization and the spread 
of socio cultural values throughout the world, with special attention devoted to states in 
the developing world (Mistree 2017). Less studied, however, is the relationship between 
globalization and military capabilities. In this study, I hope to rectify this deficiency in 
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the academic knowledge by arguing and testing that more globalized states tend to 
represent a larger portion of the world’s military capabilities.  
Previous research concerned with globalization and military power focused on the 
effects of military spending on economic growth (Galvin 2003; Yakovlev 2007). Others 
have observed the connection between increased military spending and militarization, 
finding that globalization is at least partially responsible (Staples 2000; Acemoglu and 
Yared 2010; Irandoust 2018). While these studies have been beneficial for expanding our 
knowledge on these topics, little has been said about the effects globalization has on the 
development of military capabilities. Those who have covered this topic typically link 
increasing military capabilities to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which has 
been gaining momentum as a field of study since the 1950s. For the United States, 
“Korea reopened the budgetary taps and initiated a period of heroic technological 
ventures. A continuing push for superior weapons to offset the numerically larger ground 
forces of the Soviet Union replaced the attritional strategies of past US wars” (Alic 2007, 
29). Crucially, the role that IT-based networks and weapons played in the success of 
allied troops during the 1991 Persian Gulf War followed this RMA. The effects of these 
weapons and technologies remain widely debated by military practitioners and academics 
alike regarding its implications on future iterations of military capabilities (Biddle 1996; 
Mahnken and Watts 1997; Cordesman 2014). The continual integration of information 
technology systems into 21st-century militaries has reignited the RMA debate about the 
future of war. Integrated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks coordinate troop movements on the 
battlefield. Fourth-generation fighter aircraft equipped with supercomputers capable of 
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processing more than 87 billion instructions per second, dominate the skies of aerial 
dogfighting (“F-15’s New Advanced High-Speed Mission Computer” 2016). Nuclear 
powered aircraft carriers accompanied by surface warships with advanced radar control 
suites coordinate oceanic combat and peacetime humanitarian operations. Ironically, 
some who have first-hand experience with advanced military capabilities in combat are 
also the same people who warn against relying too heavily on them in military operations 
(“A Conversation with Lieutenant General” 2014). Likewise, others argue that weapon 
systems alone, no matter the level of technological sophistication, do not provide states 
with a guaranteed formula for success. Only when these systems have been wedded to 
much larger theories of strategy and policy can objectives combine to form a coherent 
approach to international conflict (Gray 1993). While these arguments are important for 
understanding resistance to the RMA, they do not provide answers as to why states 
continue to invest large sums of money and energy into developing and adopting new 
military capabilities.  
There are numerous reasons that explain why a state might seek to expand on its 
existing military capabilities by adopting an innovative piece of technology. Strategic 
necessity, international norms, offense-defense considerations, cultural openness, the 
need for interoperability with allies, and national growth are some of the main 
considerations of states when deciding to pursue a major military innovation (Goldman 
and Andres 1999; Horowitz 2010). Realists center their explanations concerning the 
spread of military capabilities often on the desire of states to maximize security and 
insulate themselves from potential threats. The cultural similarity between states, 
particularly allies, may also drive a state towards pursuing an expansion in its military 
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capabilities (Young 2003). However, there is a common thread that links these theories 
together, and that is diffusion. The process of diffusion emerges as a more likely 
explanation, since technological improvements of the past several decades mean 
information is communicated expeditiously to attentive actors in the international system. 
Both Goldman and Eliason (2003) and Horowitz (2010) have linked the concept of 
diffusion to military capabilities. The work of Goldman and Eliason (2003) merges 
theories concerning the RMA with historical examples of specific military innovations, 
painting a broad picture about the diffusion of military capabilities over time. For 
instance, Chris Demchak’s essay on the global diffusion of the information technology-
based military model suggests the future path of the world’s modernizing nations is being 
led by the field-defining actions of the US military’s ambitious plans, budget size, 
defense industry support, international visibility, and the speed and ease of global 
commercial communications (Demchak 2003). This closely aligns with previous theories 
that proclaim that states tend to emulate the successful patterns of others (Waltz 1979). 
The work of Horowitz (2010) offers the adoption-capacity theory as an explanation as to 
why certain states succeed in adopting innovative military capabilities where others fail. 
Horowitz identifies the organizational capacity of a state and financial intensity of 
weapons programs as playing a key role in determining the spread of these capabilities 
over time. These studies on the diffusion of military power provide a solid foundational 
analysis to build upon. I believe that more globalized states tend to represent a greater 
share of the world’s military capabilities, suggesting that they are more likely to adopt 
innovations and spend more on their militaries in the process. 
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In this manuscript, I find that economic globalization negatively correlates with 
military capabilities, while informational globalization positively correlates with military 
capabilities. These results suggest that there are differentiating factors that contribute to 
whether states can increase their share of global military power. Bearing this in mind I 
proceed as follows: First, I start by examining what the literature says about 
globalization, military capabilities, and the diffusion of innovations with respect paid to 
the diffusion of military power. Tracing the historical roots of globalization will help give 
us a better idea about how it has progressed to become one of the most studied topics of 
academic inquiry in the past half-century. Next, I observe arguments pertaining to 
economic interdependence and globalization, which suggest a decline in the frequency of 
interstate wars. This leads me to explore the different methods of measuring military 
power, since a vast gulf exists between those who argue in favor of outcomes and those 
who argue in favor of the quantifiable attributes of a state’s military forces. Next, I turn to 
the studies on innovation, diffusion, and the role of military doctrine in expanding 
military capabilities. Once I address these arguments of the literature, the next sections 
cover my quantitative analysis. The methodology section conducts quantitative analyses 
using measures of capabilities and spending as a function of globalization. Together, this 
data covers all states in the international system for the period of 1970-2011. The 
subsequent sections discuss the results and conclusions of these tests.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Roots of Globalization  
In its most simplistic form, globalization “is generally understood to include two 
inter-related elements: the opening of international borders to increasingly fast flows of 
goods, services, finance, people and ideas; and the changes in institutions and policies at 
national and international levels that facilitate or promote such flows” (World Health 
Organization N.d.). Although one is likely to encounter minor differences in definition 
within the literature on globalization, the consensus is one that stresses the opening of 
markets to the world. In political science literature, globalization studies now constitute a 
major portion of the extant research. In order to make better sense of this research, some 
have sought to add qualifying terminology to delineate between the several fields of 
emphasis. For instance, the globalization of markets and trade refers to economic 
globalization. As a field of study economic globalization now covers everything ranging 
from the economic policies of the developing world (Arndt 1999) to studies on the 
increasing role of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in the international economy 
(Mathews 2006). Alternatively, differences among political systems, notably the spread 
of democracy, refer to political globalization. And, if one is interested in studying the 
uniqueness of cultures then we could say it would be beneficial for them to refer to the 
literature on cultural globalization. Therefore, tracing the historical roots of globalization 
will help illuminate some of the complexities surrounding this topic.  
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That globalization is not a new phenomenon is widely agreed upon, however, less 
agreed upon is the point in history where globalization became a topic of widespread 
recognition (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002). Some trace globalization back to the 
empires of antiquity, such as that of the Romans, who traded with their immediate 
neighbors in Europe (Geraghty 2007; Pitts and Versulys 2014). A disparate view links the 
rise of globalization to the 19th century (Buzan and Lawson 2013). Still, others argue the 
period from 1870 to 1914 represented the high-water mark of globalization (Daudin et al 
2008). The majority, however, agree that the first wave of globalization ended at the 
onset of WWI in 1914 (Daudin et al 2008; Ortiz-Ospina, Beltekian, and Roser 2019). 
Nonetheless, first-wave globalization is widely recognized as having major implications 
on future iterations of globalization. Indeed, the global order of things such as they exist 
today is an extension of the economic, political, and social events of these earlier periods. 
However, it is also important to realize as a field of study globalization had been widely 
overlooked until the end of the Second World War.  
The second wave of globalization brought with it the rise of a new superpower, 
the United States, and a global order largely crafted in its own image. This image values 
free trade, liberalism, and the spread of democracy to distant regions of the world. The 
postwar years saw countries rebuilding the global economy and a large effort to 
establishing international institutions and agreements that sought to increase the free flow 
of trade across global markets (Horowitz 2004). For instance, The United States and its 
allies established the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) before 1950. The second wave of 
globalization has also been described by some scholars as the ‘long peace’ due to the lack 
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of major interstate war during its existence (Gaddis 1986). Institutions and agreements, 
like the ones mentioned above, have also helped create an international environment 
conducive to the spread of information and technology. However, as a concept, 
globalization remained largely understudied well throughout the 1950s. It is not until the 
1960s that we finally get a concrete definition of globalization added to most dictionaries 
(Waters 2001; James and Steger 2014). Yet, even as economic growth continued to 
expand well throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s, globalization remained as a 
field of study, frequently overlooked.  
The 1990s onwards marked a major shift in globalization trends. The amount of 
published scholarly work on the subject rose by astronomical rates. For instance, 
published scholarly articles that include the word globalization for the period of 1950-
1989 is just 741, compared to 94,766 for the period of 1990-2019. This period is also 
highly relevant to the study of globalization because the rapid spread of information 
technology systems increased the speed and ease with which international trade and 
commerce was conducted. The work of Roser and Ritchie (2019) maps out the 
technological progress and sophistication of these systems over time. The current era of 
technological globalization is sometimes referred to as the age of informatization, or “the 
process through which new communication technologies are used to further 
socioeconomic development as a nation becomes more and more an information society” 
(Rogers 2003, 71). But, informatization stretches beyond merely the commercial aspects 
of technology diffusion. As Arquilla (2003) puts it, “advanced information technologies 
clearly improve productivity and profitability, but they are almost all inherently ‘dual-
use’-that is, they can generally be used for a wide variety of military activities, from 
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improving long-range missile guidance systems to facilitating the design and manufacture 
of better hardware, such as tanks, planes, and even submarines” (349). In 2004, China 
altered its military strategy to reflect the growing importance of informatization in war, 
“through the application of information technology to all aspects of military operations, 
including sensors and electronics on weapons systems and platforms, automated 
command and control systems, and nonlethal information operations [such as 
information, cyber, electronic, public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare]” (Fravel 
2016, 219). The United States military currently operates numerous different types of 
aircraft that make use of these dual-use technologies. Perhaps most important to the 
success of US military operations are its advanced command and control aircraft. Some 
of the most notable types are the Boeing RC-135 Rivet Joint, with an onboard sensor 
suite, which allows the crew to detect, identify, and geo-locate signals throughout the 
electromagnetic spectrum (2012); the Boeing P-8 Poseidon, which possesses an active 
multi-static and passive acoustic sensor system, inverse synthetic aperture radar, new 
electronic support measures system, new electro-optical/infrared sensor and a digital 
magnetic anomaly detector (2019); and most infamously the Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS 
(Airborne Warning and Control System), with a mission suite that includes more than 13 
consoles capable of displaying computer-processed data in graphic and tabular format on 
video screens (2015). Advances in American weaponry and others like these represent 
the global transition from the industrial revolution to the information revolution. Max 
Boot (2006) argues this point precisely as he traces the evolution of commercial 
technology and its application in modern system militaries. “Commodities such as 
microprocessors, the global positioning system (GPS), and wireless telephony, have all 
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been incorporated to some degree in military platforms by the world’s leading 
superpower, the United States” (2006, 309). This provides America with a notable 
qualitative advantage over hostile armed forces stuck in the ideological and strategic 
dispositions of the industrial age. However, as other countries continually pursue 
attempts at frustrating and negating the advantages of the US military, the spread of these 
systems has increased rapidly over the past few decades. More importantly, few states 
show any signs of potentially halting their weapons programs focused on researching the 
progression of these advanced capabilities. In this way, globalization is having a 
tremendous impact on the quality of weapons by increasing their levels of accuracy and 
lethality; ramifications that are explored later in this paper. For now, I turn to the 
literature on globalization and economic interdependence. 
Economic Interdependence and National Security 
Prior to determining the best method for measuring military capabilities for my 
study, I need to first address arguments which challenge the notion that military 
capabilities are the predominant metric that states use to gauge the intentions of others in 
the international system. Globalization has no doubt increased trade between states and 
across them through a variety of public and private diplomatic channels. Supporters of 
the economic interdependence theory find that globalized trade and monetary 
vulnerability explains why states are less likely to fight costly wars. Although it is true 
that globalization has driven the economies of countries closer together, critics of 
interdependence believe that states still focus on their domestic economic and political 
needs, even to the neglect of the world system and occasionally to peace. 
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As the world approached the end of the 20th century, economic expansion 
reached new heights following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the incorporation 
of numerous eastern European countries into the global economy. Notably, Francis 
Fukuyama (1989) believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union signaled ‘the end of 
history’ since liberal democracy would eventually come to be the predominant form of 
governance. Globalization studies of the 1990s and early 2000s reignited interests in 
academic circles about theories pertaining to the increasing prevalence of international 
cooperation and economic interdependence between states. As in, supporters of 
interdependence see conflict as less likely because of the costs associated with fighting 
(Gartzke 2007). It is worth examining these arguments, because they challenge the belief 
that states base their international economic and political choices upon domestic 
preferences. 
The work of Russett and O’Neal (2001) expands on the idea of economic 
interdependence, by proposing that it forms one of the three foundational elements for 
Kantian Peace thereby decreasing the likelihood of interstate war. Following the logic of 
Kant, they state:  
democracy, by its recognition of individual liberty and responsibility, 
encourages entrepreneurship and the expansion of commerce, ultimately beyond 
the boundaries of a single state. As the economic activities of citizens make 
countries more and more interdependent, there is an increasing need for 
institutions that can regulate and facilitate trade and investment. Thus, 
international law and institutions are established in response to the actions of the 
citizens of democratic states pursuing their interests over a constantly expanding 
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geographical area. The three elements of the Kantian peace are, therefore, part of 
a whole that contributes to a stable peace (Russett and O’Neal 2001, 157).  
The three factors work towards creating an international environment free of 
vicious cycles and instead, attempt to create a virtuous cycle out of international 
interactions. Over time, increased interactions contribute to reinforcing the virtuosity of 
the system and help promote peace, ultimately reducing the likelihood of interstate 
conflict.  
Yet, Waltz (1999), through the lens of neorealism, contends that the actions of 
states very much do matter in determining the outcome of international political events. 
Rather, domestic political choices have a major influence on international economic 
globalization, not vice versa, as some interdependence theorists might suggest (Waltz 
1999; Hiscox 2010). For instance, were the world as globalized as advocates of 
interdependence theory maintain, then one should expect the ease with which trade is 
conducted domestically to be equivalent to what it is internationally. Yet, this has not 
always been entirely true,  
U.S. output is about one-fourth of gross world product. The output of 
producers in other countries is thus about three-fourths of gross world product. If 
Americans were prone to buy goods and services from foreign producers as easily 
as from domestic producers then foreign products would constitute a share of US 
spending equal to that of the spending of the average resident of the planet. The 
US import-GDP ratio would equal .75. The same would be true of the US export-
GDP ratio. And yet these ratios are only about one-sixth of this hypothetical level. 
In other words, globalization would have to increase another six-fold, as 
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measured by the trade ratio, before it would literally be true that Americans did 
business as easily across the globe as across the country (Frankel 2011, 308).  
The rise in economic interdependence or globalization over time has not 
altogether prevented states from continuing to pursue radically different domestic 
policies, some of which have contributed to damaging the international system. Using 
WWI as an example, Waltz shows that mere economic interdependence alone was not 
enough to prevent the states of Western Europe from going to war in 1914. Additionally, 
Barbieri (1996) finds that increased levels of economic interdependence between dyads 
increases the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes. The results of these studies 
suggest that domestic political considerations play a dominant role in the international 
ambitions of states. Additionally, it suggests that economic interdependence alone does 
not appear to be enough to prevent states from occasionally perceiving the utility 
associated with the use of armed violence.  
Economic interdependence theories offer a mixed bag of conclusions concerning 
the possibility of interstate conflict. Copeland (1996) adopts an approach that argues both 
liberal and realist explanations fail to account for why states choose to go to war when 
economic interdependence is high, or abstain from war when interdependence is low. As 
such, Copeland combines the two positions to create “a consistent deductive theory of 
state decision-making showing the conditions under which high interdependence will 
lead to peace or war” (1996, 17). Under this new theory, he posits that states expecting 
high levels of trade to continue well into the future will be less likely to sever ties and 
view dependence as threatening to their security. However, should a state find itself in a 
position wherein future trade could decrease, and thereby amplify the effects of 
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dependence, war may be the more likely outcome. Although Copeland’s approach is 
novel in the sense that it acutely blends both theoretical perspectives regarding economic 
interdependence, it suffers from its own setbacks. A major problem with Copeland’s 
theory is that it relies heavily on the availability of perfect information about actors’ 
preferences. Often, this type of information is only available ex post, making it difficult 
to predict state desires in a contemporaneous setting.  
The proposition that states with higher levels of trade and integration to the world 
economy are less likely to become embroiled in conflict is a theory that finds ample 
support within the political science research. However, it is not without its limitations, 
namely because domestic political actors have a significant say in the economic policies 
of their respective countries. The results of these studies suggest that experts are divided 
on the topic of interdependence as a stabilizing force in international relations. It is true 
that globalization has increased rapidly in recent decades and contributed to increased 
levels of interdependence, especially among most the world’s democracies. However, the 
potential for violent conflict persists as a reality of the international environment, thus it 
remains crucially important to account for the differences in military capabilities between 
states.  
Measuring Military Capabilities  
The military capabilities of states, like any other unit of analysis in the 
international system, are constantly being compared to one another. For instance, during 
the height of the Cold War, the United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
released yearly reports of Soviet military capabilities from 1981 until the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 (DIA 2019). In 2018, the DIA began publishing a yearly catalog on 
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China, now commonly seen as the rising hegemonic power in Asia, and its increasingly 
diverse assortment of weapons (Garamone 2019). Since 1959, The International Institute 
of Strategic Studies (IISS) has been releasing an annual assessment of the military 
capabilities for 171 countries from around the world (Sixty Years of the Military Balance, 
2019). Military capabilities occupy a unique position within international relations 
because capabilities are a crucial determinant for the balance of power between states. As 
Waltz suggests, “The most important events in international politics are explained by 
differences in the capabilities of states, not economic forces operating across states or 
transcending them” (2000, 52). But how does one go about properly measuring military 
capabilities? What are the types of power, and more importantly, what does it mean to 
have power over others? What are the most important factors to consider when 
attempting to accurately evaluate the military capabilities of a state? Is it troop 
performance, the sophistication of military technology, the latent production capacity of a 
state, or a combination of these factors that form the foundational basis of power? These 
questions and more are the driving force behind many of the disagreements that populate 
the literature on military capabilities. To answer these questions, I start by examining the 
different types of power states possess and whether these can translate into political 
outcomes. 
A state has access to a wide variety of tools to help it achieve its foreign policy 
goals. The single most prominent tool is military power because it affords states the 
possibility to coerce opponents. To accomplish this task states can use military power 
either implicitly or explicitly. Art (2015) provides a convincing comparison, “the war-
waging use of military power is akin to a powerful flood: it washes away all before it. 
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The peaceful use of military power is akin to a gravitational field among large objects in 
space: it affects all motion that takes place, but it produces it affects imperceptibly” (3). 
Military power is the cornerstone upon which international relations is built and manages 
most interactions between states in the system. A state’s primary concern pertains to 
matters of its own security; therefore, it is keenly aware of the military capabilities of 
others, especially potential adversaries. However, accurately gauging the capabilities of 
others is a difficult task because military power takes on a variety of different forms and 
has an equally wide range of applications. The use of military force need not always be 
explicitly ordained in the deployment of troops, ships, or aircraft to hostile territory. 
Instead, states can express military power implicitly through diplomatic channels or 
internationally recognized threats. Realist arguments stress the use of hard power, while 
liberals tend more towards those of soft power; both play an important role in 
international relations. 
Advocates of soft power present it as providing elements of utility not always 
available to strategies that emphasize solely a hard power approach (Nye 1990, 2011). 
The benefits of soft power are that a state may successfully achieve its foreign policy 
objectives without needing to expend many resources or energy to do so. Nye (2011) 
envisions soft power as having the ability to either directly or indirectly influence 
international outcomes. In a scenario where soft power has a direct influence, Nye argues 
that the actions of one elite decision-maker can persuade another politically important 
figure to undertake a specific action in response. In this example, the relationship 
between elites is critically important because the message is directly from one head of 
state to another. An indirect use of soft power attempts to influence public and third party 
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attitudes rather than the opinions of an elite. However, these forms of soft power are 
heavily reliant on the ability to wield diplomacy with a level of adroitness, often not 
found in most political leaders. 
The benefits of a soft power approach are well documented but neglect to mention 
some of its limitations. For instance, soft power often works best when two actors share a 
similar cultural or historical connection, an absence of such a connection can make it 
difficult for important figureheads or populations to connect on important issues. This is a 
fact that even Nye concedes. He states “thus, a given cultural artifact, such as a 
Hollywood movie that portrays liberated women acting independently, may produce 
positive attraction in Rio but revulsion in Riyadh” (2011, 93). Furthermore, the utility of 
soft power is largely context-specific, meaning there are periodically instances in history 
where it is of no benefit whatsoever. Recall for a moment that the nature of the 
international environment is competitive and states sometimes resort to the use of force 
or violence to achieve their political goals. In such cases, undesirable states or leaders act 
with malign intentions and brutality to subjugate innocent populations. Military hard 
power, whether by economic sanctions or tactical combat operations, may be the only 
plausible course of action in such a scenario. As Colin Gray argues, “there are conflicts 
that cannot be resolved politically, sufficiently alleviated by diplomacy or any other non-
military means, or settled by some tolerable compromise” (2011, 47). Therefore, “in a 
world in which states must still ultimately look to their own defenses, ‘hard power’—the 
capacity to coerce, deter, defend, and destroy—remains the essential currency of 
international politics” (Friedburg 2012, 215). 
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There are also wide-ranging disagreements concerning the proper way to quantify 
military capabilities. Those who argue in favor of measuring capabilities as outcomes do 
so because it combines elements of utility often not captured by measures focused solely 
on measuring weapon and troop preponderance. Defining power in terms of outcomes 
often means including non-material factors such as troop morale, cultural identity, 
tactical training, and education levels, all of which can have a significant effect on 
determining whether a military is victorious in battle. For instance, Kenneth Pollack’s 
excellent examination of Arab military ineffectiveness is best explained, not by military 
doctrine or material capabilities, but rather by the culture of Arab armed forces (Pollack 
2019). One of the foremost pieces on military outcomes is Stephen Biddle’s Military 
Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (2004). The main premise of 
Biddle’s book is that previous explanations pertaining to battlefield outcomes do not 
provide a definitive answer to questions regarding what makes some militaries more 
powerful than others. Neither the theories that stress numerical preponderance nor those 
that observe the relative sophistication of technology can account for why weaker states 
occasionally defeat far stronger and better-equipped powers in war. Instead, Biddle 
argues that it is how forces are deployed onto a battlefield that matters most. In modern 
war, weapons can more easily defeat poorly organized troops than armies that make use 
of tactics such as cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, and other techniques 
necessary for avoiding large-scale decimation. He argues that:   
a particular pattern of force employment—the modern system—has been pivotal 
in the twentieth century and is likely to remain so. I argue that since at least 1900, 
the dominant technological fact of the modern battlefield has been increasing 
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lethality. Subsequent technological change has only increased over which 
exposure can be fatal. To perform meaningful military missions in the face of this 
storm of steel requires armies to reduce their exposure, and since 1918 the central 
means of doing so has been the modern system of force employment (Biddle 
2004, 2-3).  
Through case study and quantitative analysis alike, Biddle finds support for his 
hypothesis that the technological improvements of the early 20th century onwards “forces 
armies to maneuver strategically on the battlefield to avoid becoming cannon fodder” 
(2004, 52). The results of his studies show that force employment is a crucially important 
aspect that militaries must consider when engaging in combat, especially against a well-
equipped and modern adversary. However, since the purpose of my paper is to examine 
the effects of globalization on military capabilities, it makes little sense to define 
capabilities in terms of outcomes. Instead, measuring capabilities as the attributes of a 
state’s military and economic forces is a better fit for my model. 
A disparate view of military capabilities, though common in the field of 
international relations, looks to the resources at a state’s disposal and compares these 
against those of others in the international system. Sometimes referred to as latent power 
or power potential, these measures are usually comprised of factors such as a state’s 
population, wealth, production capacity, military personnel, and other socio-economic 
factors. Unlike studies that focus on outcomes as a measure of capabilities, this method 
attempts to provide statesmen and scholars with an accurate approximation of the balance 
of power between states in the international system during peacetime. An advocate of this 
approach is John Mearsheimer who argues that states have two types of power, latent and 
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military. While not synonymous, both measures are important for properly gauging the 
overall power of competitors. To Mearsheimer, latent power is important because, “great 
powers need money, technology, and personnel to build military forces and to fight wars” 
(2014, 55). To do this, Mearsheimer looks to Gross National Product (GNP) as an 
indicator of a state’s latent power. However, there are some potential pitfalls for using 
GNP, namely because states with similar levels of GNP can simultaneously be at 
different levels of development. “Previously, China’s GNP looked very similar to that of 
the United States and Japan’s, while roughly 10 percent of China’s wealth remained tied 
up in agriculture” (2014, 63-65). When it comes to military power, Mearsheimer believes 
ground forces to be of the greatest importance for accurately measuring military 
capabilities, because only states with formidable land power can conquer and control 
territory. To be sure, he recognizes that air and naval forces are a crucial component of 
military capabilities, but their mission primarily centers on supporting ground forces.  
Mearsheimer’s conception of power, both in its latent and military form, closely 
mirrors the Correlates of War’s dataset on National Material Capabilities. The COW 
(Correlates of War) data looks at six material factors of state capacity: military 
expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban 
population, and total population. Some of these factors overlap neatly with those 
identified by Mearsheimer as salient to any measure of latent or military power. In fact, 
the COW dataset expands on the underlying arguments of Mearsheimer and addresses 
some of the shortcomings associated with his GNP specific approach to quantification. 
For example, including factors such as energy consumption and urban population allows 
for a better approximation of a state’s level of development. Increases in energy 
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consumption could be the result of a few things, such as an equivalent increase in 
population, or more importantly a rise in the proportion of the population that has access 
to technology that requires greater amounts of energy. Studies on this topic tend to 
support the theory that higher levels of energy consumption are analogous with increases 
in economic growth (Dolgopolova, Muhhamad Hye, and Stewart 2014; Gozgor, Lau, and 
Lu 2018). Urban population closely ties to development, evidenced by the rapid growth 
of people across the globe living in urban areas over time (Spence, Annez, and Buckley 
2009). According to the United Nations, “the urban population of the world has grown 
rapidly from 751 million in 1950 to 4.2 billion in 2018” (68% Of The World Population, 
2018). This leads me to believe that higher levels of energy consumption and urban 
population are sufficient measures of latent power. The COW dataset also contains 
relevant measures pertaining to military power, including the important component of 
military personnel. Although there is a minor difference between the COW measure of 
military power and Mearsheimer’s interpretation, the two are still closely linked. Unlike 
Mearsheimer who believes in measuring military power solely in terms of a state’s 
ground forces, the COW dataset on military personnel covers all branches of a state’s 
military. However, this should not be much of a problem for measuring the size of a 
state’s ground forces, because it is unlikely that states with large air and naval forces 
would have a miniscule army by comparison. Overall, the COW data provides a good 
measure of power since it controls for several important explanatory factors regarding 
military capabilities, and more importantly address some of the deficiencies associated 
with a single-variable approach to measuring military capabilities.  
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For modern states, military capabilities remain the essential currency of foreign 
policy. States with greater levels of military power, both hard and soft, have access to a 
wider variety of options when dealing with other actors in the system. To be able to 
influence the actions of others without directly deploying troops is an art of power that 
not all states have mastered yet. As such, the tangible elements of military capabilities in 
the form of ground troops, aircraft, tanks, submarines, and destroyers are some of the 
most potent forms of military hard power currently available. The mere presence of these 
systems and forces can make states behave with a degree of caution. Capturing the 
difference in aptitude between militaries is often a difficult task, especially in the absence 
of combat outcomes that can provide us with discernable conclusions about the balance 
of power. However, as political scientists like John Mearsheimer have shown, it is 
possible for states to approximately assess the relative power of others without needing to 
engage in war to do so. But what explains why these capabilities spread throughout the 
international system? What is the process by which they spread from one state to another 
in a different corner of the globe? The literature on diffusion provides a perspicacious 
examination of these questions. 
The Diffusion of Military Capabilities 
Existing research on the spread of military capabilities tends to focus on the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons following the end of World War II. A great many 
debates have been had on the threat nuclear weapons pose to the stability of the 
international system (Gartzke and Kroenig 2009; Sagan and Waltz 2013; Bell and Miller 
2015; Sechser and Fuhrmann 2017). The developments of the late 1960s and the signing 
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) also suggests that the 
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development of nuclear weapons is not inevitable. Further, proliferation studies tend to 
focus solely on nuclear weapons—evidenced in the historical comparison between 
American and Soviet nuclear arsenals—to the neglect of relevant conventional military 
capabilities (Santoro 2005, 2006). Thus, diffusion, which focuses on the spread of any 
novel technology or idea, provides a better fit for studying the spread of military 
capabilities. The preeminent scholarly work on the process of diffusion comes from 
Everett M. Rogers Diffusion of Innovations (2003). In his book, Rogers defines diffusion 
as the process by which “(1) an innovation (2) is communicated through certain channels 
(3) over time (4) among the members of a social system” (2003, 11). At first, a singular 
actor will invest in researching and developing an innovation. Once the innovation is 
communicated to other members of the social system, a take-off period occurs whereby 
more actors begin to adopt the technology. As the popularity of the innovation increases 
over time, so too does the number of users. Eventually, it reaches most actors, which 
leads to a gradual tapering off as it becomes more common. It is worth focusing with 
greater attention on the second attribute of Rogers’s definition, namely how information 
is communicated to other actors in the social system. Rogers states, “mass media 
channels are usually the most rapid and efficient means of informing an audience of 
potential adopters about the existence of an innovation—that is, to create awareness-
knowledge” (2003, 18). Globalization has exaggerated this process by creating several 
new mass media channels that globally broadcast important information about another 
state’s capabilities in a near instantaneous manner. This is especially true when speaking 
of military capabilities and defense related issues. Although other actors may not know 
the details of a new weapons systems at first, the very existence of a new weapon may 
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lead other countries to pursue parallel capabilities. Thus, the proliferation of mass media 
in the era of second-wave globalization, whether through internet or wireless telephone 
channels, is likely to have a profound impact on how states manage their own military 
capabilities in relation to those of others. 
The process of diffusion as depicted by Rogers is evident in historical examples 
regarding the spread of military technology, ideas, strategy, and capabilities. For instance, 
Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason’s The Diffusion of Military Technology and 
Ideas (2003) which includes, Thomas Durell-Young’s study on cooperative diffusion 
through cultural similarity and Thomas Mahnken’s chapter on the diffusion of blitzkrieg 
strategy during World War II is representative of this relationship. Additional studies 
such as Michael Horowitz’s The Diffusion of Military Power (2010), helps build on 
previous research by creating a theoretical framework through which the diffusion of 
military capabilities can be studied more intensely over time. This framework, proposed 
by Horowitz, focuses on two factors critical for determining whether a given military 
innovation will diffuse throughout the international system. First, the financial intensity 
associated with pursuing an innovation may hinder the diffusion process.  
The costs associated with building and maintaining military capabilities in the 
modern system are exorbitantly high. Developing entirely new capabilities is a high-risk, 
high-reward enterprise that requires a great deal of investment for potential gains to be 
realized. The United States F-35 fighter program has attracted a significant amount of 
controversy due to its projected lifetime cost, which amounts to roughly $1.196 trillion 
spent over the course of six decades (Capaccio 2019). Considering the rate at which 
technology continues to proceed, the more than one trillion-dollar stealth fighter program 
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risks becoming obsolete prior to its estimated deadline. Technological improvements in 
over the horizon radar (OTHR) and hypersonic missiles create a threat environment that 
almost entirely negates the preexisting advantages of the F-35 (Speier, Nacouzi, Lee, and 
Moore 2017; Yoshihara and Holmes 2018). The contemporary nature of these weapons 
systems means most are extremely financially exhaustive to produce, requiring states to 
spend a greater amount on their military in the process. To further put current global 
military spending into perspective, the $1.822 trillion spent in 2018 works out to roughly 
$4.9 billion spent each day (SIPRI 2019). Financing a capable and well-equipped military 
in the modern system can be extremely burdensome, especially for states with limited 
economic potential. Therefore, wealth and population are imperative factors to consider 
in any study measuring military capabilities. As such, high costs associated with many of 
these programs serve as an impediment to the spread of these systems globally. This is 
precisely one of the main considerations of Horowitz’s adoption-capacity theory. The 
costs of adopting a military innovation may prevent a state from doing so, even if it can 
identify the benefits of acquiring the innovation. This leads Horowitz to hypothesize “the 
greater the financial intensity required to implement the innovation, the slower the spread 
of the innovation at the system level and the lower the probability that a state will attempt 
to adopt the innovation” (2010, 39). Through case study analysis, Horowitz can conclude 
that financial barriers prevent states from adopting costly weapons platforms. Legacy 
weapons like aircraft carriers pose a substantial challenge to states due to the immense 
amount of financial capital and investment required to produce such systems.  
Additionally, Horowitz (2010) believes that the organizational capacity of states 
can serve as an impediment to the diffusion of military capabilities. This argument 
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closely aligns with those who posit that military doctrine prevents militaries from 
adopting new strategies or weapons. Governments are populated by a diverse set of 
organizations and individuals with interests often closely aligned to the policy 
preferences set by the government itself, the military included. In democracies, civilian 
oversight of the military can sometimes lead politicians to have an even greater influence 
on the organizational doctrine of the armed forces. For instance, the United States Senate 
Armed Services Committee frequently holds hearings concerning matters of national 
security strategy, foreign threats, and defense spending among other relevant topics. The 
implications of such hearings are that US military generals and admirals must be acutely 
aware of their government’s preferences and prepared to rationalize how new capabilities 
coincide with their government’s interests. Hence, “Now as always, the most important 
problems are not tactical but strategic and political. Over what issues, and where, should 
we be prepared to threaten the use of military force? What kinds of military judgments 
are reasonable in a nuclear age? These and other questions of like moment will determine 
the major parameters within which major weapon-systems choices will be made; but far 
more important are the effects of the pertinent answers upon the life and well-being of the 
state” (Brodie 1976). Most military doctrines are molded by the immediate threats a state 
expects to face soon, making sure that the programs and weapons required to do so are 
in-line with government interests. However, not all military doctrines form a rigid and 
intransigent ideological conviction regarding such matters. Rather, militaries much like 
the governments they serve, have some degree of decisional latitude. Just as a 
government can support and pass a new tax policy, so too can militaries invest in a new 
weapon or strategy. Therefore, it is helpful to think of militaries as existing within the 
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structure of a government, bound to some degree to pursue its initiatives, but not without 
its own ability to experiment. To think of a military as an entirely archaic and immovable 
force would be to miss much of the inventive characteristics of this organization. 
Yet, Posen (2015) argues militaries are unlikely to deviate from an established 
doctrine because a process of institutionalization gives its members an incentive to 
preserve things as they currently exist. To Posen, this means innovations will rarely be 
sponsored by the organization itself, since innovations potentially threaten the established 
organizational rules. However, one reason militaries may innovate despite internal 
pressure not to, must do with how loosely the organizational doctrine is structured. All 
organizational doctrines, be they military or business, operate based on a set of rules 
meant to guide their members in completing certain duties critical to the success of the 
institution. This is known as critical task focus; the more loosely defined the critical task 
the easier it should be for the organization to incorporate new ideas. As Horowitz (2010) 
explains, “the more specifically a military organization defines its critical task, the harder 
it should be for a military to adopt an innovation. An organization with a broader critical 
task focus will find it easier to justify, within the organization, how the innovation fits 
within the regular ‘actions’ of the organization” (2010, 36). Rogers (2003) uses Lockheed 
Martin’s famed skunkworks weapons laboratory as an example of how states bargain to 
maintain organizational doctrine whilst simultaneously balancing research and 
development needs without sacrificing either. He argues, the bureaucratic rigidity of the 
US military’s established doctrine has not been extremely conducive to the 
experimentation of new weapons systems, but it has allowed for some leniency 
historically. “A skunkworks provides a means of getting the best of both” bureaucratic 
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stability and innovation (2003, 150). This is the same skunkworks that manufactured the 
highly influential F-117 Nighthawk, which was instrumental in the success of allied 
airpower during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In describing the production of the F117, 
Boot writes, “the stealth work cut through normal Pentagon red tape. The first prototype 
of the first F-117A stealth fighter was ready to fly in 1977 and the first production-line 
model was delivered in 1981-a remarkably fast procurement cycle” (2006, 328). This 
example shows how states are sometimes capable of managing both military doctrine and 
researching innovations. 
Moving the Research Forward 
The literature on globalization, interdependence, military capabilities, and 
diffusion are linked in ways that past research has neglected to explore fully. Historically, 
studies on globalization have focused on tracing its lineage over time, documenting its 
idiosyncrasies across a wide range of topics. For instance, an attribute of the second wave 
of globalization is increased economic, democratic, and institutional interdependence 
which leads some scholars to suggest that interstate war is decreasing in likelihood, as 
domestic political needs become subservient to international outcomes. Yet, it is quite 
clear that states still focus primarily on domestic considerations first, prior to acting upon 
their international ambitions (Waltz 2000). The powerful influence that domestic 
considerations play in world politics means that states find utility in investing heavily in 
military capabilities. Some actors find greater benefit in the methods of soft power, while 
others contend that there is no substitute for hard power in the form of overt coercion or 
military force. However, an extremely tactful political leader is likely to make good use 
of both strategies, skillfully maneuvering from one to the other as the situation warrants 
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it. Yet, how does one measure military capabilities? Like the division between soft and 
hard power, political scientists argue from two diametrically opposed perspectives on 
how best to capture the military capabilities of a state. To measure capabilities through 
battlefield outcomes is beneficial because it separates the truly powerful from the weak. 
War is a rare occurrence in international relations and its presence helps politicians, 
generals, and academics alike separate the adept military forces from the inept. A second 
approach to measuring military capabilities stresses the econometric factors of state 
capacity that go into building strong military forces. These factors are helpful for gauging 
the approximate power of the actors in the international system during peacetime. Finally, 
the spread of these capabilities over time has been helped along by the process of 
globalization and the rise of information technology networks such as the internet. The 
research has shown us that states may occasionally experience hurdles when attempting 
to innovate militarily, but these can be overcome by ascertaining how new capabilities fit 
within the existing parameters of a state’s military doctrine. Together, these studies 
highlight how globalization works to foster an international environment conducive to the 
spread of wealth and technology, two features paramount for building an adept and 
modern military fighting force. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The study of political science is characterized by an abundant number of theories 
that offer differing and insightful approaches to domestic and international issues. For 
international relations scholars, the theories of realism, liberalism, Marxism, and 
constructivism are some of the most established doctrinal approaches. Of these theories, 
realism is a dominant and recurrent method of study with a substantial body of research 
underpinning its arguments. The utility of realism, in its various forms, is its unique 
ability to explain in clear and concise terminology the relationship between the actions of 
states and international outcomes. However, this approach to international relations 
theory is sometimes cited by critics as being overly simplistic and rigid in its 
characterization of how states view the international system. This is because realist 
arguments concerning state actions center on the premise that states are fundamentally 
concerned about matters of their own security (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). Further, 
realism stresses that the absence of an overarching global politico-military authority 
capable of punishing malevolent actors, accentuates the self-reliant nature of international 
relations. As such, states will do just about everything within their faculty to increase 
their share of power and security. Hence, it becomes easy to see how military capabilities 
factor in as a crucial component that states use for evaluating the complexion of the 
international environment. My analysis operates in accordance with realist assumptions 
about international relations, by arguing that states will pursue increases in military 
capabilities whenever possible as a means of enhancing their security. Consequently, 
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there are a few reasons that lead me to believe that economic and informational 
globalization have a significant impact on military capabilities. 
Principally, globalization correlates highly with economic growth. That is, more 
globalized states on average tend to be wealthier than their less globalized counterparts 
(Rodrik 2018). An increase in industrial capacity and productivity are some of the major 
factors that contribute to a rise in economic growth. As a state becomes more 
economically globalized, information regarding more efficient means of production 
become available. At the same time, these new methods of production are incorporated 
more broadly into manufacturing sectors, which causes a rise in industrial output. China 
represents a good example of this relationship, where its rise in steel production 
corresponds neatly with its rise in economic globalization. “In 2009, China accounted for 
about 46% of the world’s total crude steel output, which represents a considerable 
increase from its share of 16% in 1999” (Tang 2010, 4). During that same period of 1999 
to 2009, China’s economic globalization increased by 8.41 that was nearly twice the 
global average increase of 4.96. Yet, why is economic growth, measured in the form of 
industrial productivity, important for studying military capabilities? Because economic 
growth generates money, a fungible asset capable of being converted into various other 
forms of power. In Robert J. Art’s words, “in rank order, the three most fungible power 
assets appear to be wealth, political skill and military power” (2015, 6). He continues by 
stating, “wealth is also integral to military power. A rich state can generate more military 
power than a poor one. A state that is large and rich can, if it so chooses, generate 
especially large amounts of military power” (2015, 6). This argument echoes that of 
Mearsheimer’s conception of military capabilities, which is closely linked to the Gross 
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National Product (GNP) of states, because “a state cannot build a powerful military if it 
does not have the money and technology to equip, train, and continually modernize its 
fighting forces” (2010, 61). Given these points, economic globalization should make it 
easier for wealthier states to shoulder the financial burden associated with equipping 
modern military forces, by enlarging their financial and capital assets.  
However, states may benefit economically from increased globalization, while 
deciding not to devote a greater amount of money towards defense spending. Rather, 
these countries may instead opt to spend a greater portion of their wealth on domestic 
social programs. The decision to spend more on social programs as opposed to defense is 
known throughout the literature as the guns versus butter argument. It states, that political 
leaders, constrained by a finite amount of financial resources, must decide between 
devoting a larger portion of these resources towards defense or social programs. Scholars 
have explored the relationship and shown empirically to have an impact on defense 
spending (Allen, Flynn, and VanDusky-Allen 2016). Thus, it may be true that as a state 
becomes more economically globalized it simultaneously becomes more inclined to 
spend a greater amount of resources on social programs, not defense. 
Moreover, research on the topic of economic interdependence suggests there are 
reasons to believe economic globalization may negatively correlate with military 
capabilities. Supporters of this theory find that the more economically globalized states 
become the more they rely on each other for goods and services important for 
maintaining economic stability. Additionally, states involved in this process benefit from 
increasing levels of trade and should therefore be less likely to view conflict as an 
effective means of achieving their economic or political objectives. Thus, economic 
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interdependence reduces the need to for states to spend heavily on military capabilities, 
since all states are better off maintaining the status quo and continuing to trade with one 
another. Yet, historical examples suggest this theory is not without its limitations. On 
occasion, economic interdependence has not been enough to prevent major powers from 
engaging in attritional struggles of extreme interstate violence. Therefore, given that 
states are primarily concerned about matters of their own security, I expect the following 
to be true: 
Hypothesis 1: Economic globalization positively correlates with increases in 
military capabilities. 
There is also good reason to believe that informational globalization influences 
the military capabilities of states. An increasingly large portion of global trade now 
focuses on the production and exportation of advanced information technology networks 
and components. The spread of these advanced technologies is transforming global trade, 
and more importantly, the characteristics of modern militaries. In the postindustrial age of 
military competition, information technology systems are now ubiquitous across the 
world’s major and minor military powers. For instance, “the B2 designed in the 1980s, 
carries 200 digital processors; a replacement designed today might have 2,000. Pilots will 
fly the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter with the aid of 22 million lines of code. Software 
requirements for the Army’s Future Combat System have risen to nearly 65 million lines 
of code, nearly doubling the initial estimate” (Alic 2007, 134). Similarly, Friedburg 
argues “the enormous advantages that the United States now enjoys are the product of its 
long-standing lead in the development and deployment of new technologies, and the 
unmatched ability of its huge and dynamic economy to carry the costs of military 
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primacy” (2013, 215). These systems have become so important to modern military 
capabilities, that some experts believe the outcome of the next great power war may 
depend entirely on which state possesses more of these weapons (Goure 2018).  
A secondary pathway may have to do with how information pertaining to military 
capabilities is communicated in an era of expanding globalization. As mentioned 
previously, mass media channels are the most effective method of communicating 
technological innovations to other actors in a social system. Thus, given the rise of mass 
media channels in the 21st century and the increasingly large portion of the world’s 
population with access to such information, we should expect a development in one 
state’s military capabilities to have a significant effect on actions of other states in the 
international system. Moreover, because developments as it pertains to military 
capabilities often have important geopolitical ramifications, states are especially attentive 
to developments in military technology that could threaten their security. A consequence 
of this process may be that increased information concerning an actor’s capabilities may 
lead a state to pursue development in a military capability that, until recently, it had no 
intention of producing. Thus, in the current age of information, characterized by a rise in 
mass media channels, we should expect such a process to have significant repercussions 
as it pertains to the military capabilities of states. Given this proposition and what the 
literature says about the importance of information technology systems to modern 
military capabilities, I expect the following to be true: 
Hypothesis 2: Informational globalization positively correlates with increases in 
military capabilities. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
The empirical section of my study tests my hypotheses by conducting an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression of all states from 1970 to 2011, with standard errors 
clustered at the state-level. This quantitative approach allows me to determine if there is 
systematic variation between measures of globalization and military power in the way 
that my hypotheses predict. To begin, I operationalize the concept of globalization by 
using the KOF Swiss Economic Institute’s data on economic and informational 
globalization. These two variations of globalization are the key independent variables of 
my study. The composition of each measure of globalization differs in ways that makes it 
important to separate the two variables, although I expect both to positively correlate with 
increases in military capabilities.   
The KOF measure on economic globalization is comprised of several different 
variables, with different weights that combine to form a cohesive measure for economic 
globalization. First, the data separates economic globalization between de jure and de 
facto measures. These types of economic globalization are as the labels imply. The de 
jure economic globalization variable includes tariffs, trade regulations, and international 
investment agreements; while the de facto economic globalization variable includes trade 
in goods, trade in services, and foreign direct investment. When further broken down, 
both economic globalization de facto and de jure are in two subsections. Among these 
subsections are trade globalization and financial globalization, each weighted 50% so that 
together they account for 100% of their respective de jure or de facto economic 
36 
 
 
globalization variable. For this study, economic globalization de facto (KOFEcGIdf) is 
more applicable because it focuses more on the statistical trade and financial measures of 
states, rather than the legal aspects of economic globalization de jure. In effect, this 
measures how trade is actually happening as opposed to just measuring the rules that 
enable it to happen; the former measures activity while the latter would measure rules 
that have variable implications. De facto trade globalization is decidedly relevant since it 
accounts for trade in goods, trade in services, and trade partner diversity. As explained 
previously, we should expect that as states globalize economically, they also become 
wealthier and more capable of spending large sums of money on defense. The same goes 
for de facto financial globalization, which considers five variables relevant to this study; 
foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, international debt, international reserves, 
and international income payments. Increases in these variables, except for international 
debt, should also correlate with increases in military capabilities. Thus, the KOF 
economic globalization de facto variable appears an appropriate measure for economic 
globalization, especially as it relates to the theoretical underpinnings of my study.  
Unlike economic globalization, informational globalization is itself a component 
of the variable social globalization. Informational globalization is separated into de facto 
and de jure measures, which consider different elements related to the spread of 
information. Again, the de facto measure of this variable (KOFInGIdf) emerges as the 
better fit for my study. It is composed of the measures used internet bandwidth, 
international patents, and high technology exports. Previous arguments concerning the 
importance of information technology systems to military capabilities make this an 
appropriate variable. I expect that countries with high levels of all three measures will on 
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average possess a greater portion of military capabilities, because high levels of each 
suggest technological prowess. In the current era, states without the ability to develop 
advanced information technology systems will suffer in terms of capabilities, due to the 
importance of such technological innovations.  
Since scholars often portray military power as a malleable concept capable of 
varying configurations, identifying a proper quantifiable measure with an equally robust 
degree of analytical rigor presents a challenge. Some argue that the most advantageous 
method of measuring capabilities is through observable battlefield outcomes, notably 
whether a given state won or lost a war (Biddle 2004). However, the problem with this 
approach is that it relies too heavily on ex post results to sketch an identifiable pattern 
between military capabilities and battlefield outcomes. Additionally, these studies suffer 
from a lack of observations that stems from the relative infrequency of major interstate 
war. Therefore, a better method is one that properly accounts for changes in a state’s 
military capabilities as it reacts to fluctuations in the international environment. Waltz 
believes the ranks of states in the international system “depends on how they score on all 
of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic 
capability, military strength, political stability, and competence” (1979, 131). Thus, for 
my main dependent variable, I measure capabilities by using the Correlates of War 
dataset on National Material Capabilities (NMC) for all states in the international system 
for the period of 1970 to 2011 (Singer 1987). This data is particularly useful because it 
accounts for both the preponderance of military forces, as well as other relevant 
econometric factors of state capacity. The COW data evaluates the national capabilities 
of a given state in the international system by combining six factors to create a 
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Composite Indicator for National Capability (CINC) score. The six figures are military 
expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban 
population, and total population. Together, these figures provide a rigorous quantification 
of the elements of state power most relevant to the study of military capabilities. The 
Correlates of War NMC data is currently the best available measure of capabilities that 
captures many factors considered important to any study primarily interested in 
attempting to quantify military power.  
One issue with the CINC variable is that it is a proportion relative to all other 
states within the system. While this has an intuitive appeal for my theory, states should 
rise in power relative to other states based on their globalizing process, each observation 
is dependent on other observations and may cause unintended errors in my estimation of 
a state’s capabilities. To test the robustness of my analysis, I alternatively replace CINC 
scores with military expenditures as a percentage of GDP (Military/GDP) for the main 
dependent variable in my second equation. To accomplish this, I use Kristian Skrede 
Gleditsch (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP data that covers all states for the years 
relevant to my study. Measuring military spending as a percentage of a state’s GDP is 
common practice among both the international community and the professional literature 
on security studies. The most prominent example of this internationally is NATO, which 
pushes its member-states to spend at least two percent of their respective GDP on defense 
each year; scholars likewise look at this dependent variable regarding NATO (Allen, 
Flynn, and VanDusky-Allen 2016). Further, including military spending as a percentage 
of GDP provides a measure of military spending that is distinct from that which is present 
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in the CINC variable. If both versions of my dependent variable are significant, then I can 
reasonably conclude that the results of such relationships are robust.  
Additionally, measuring a state’s gross military expenditure does not provide an 
accurate representation of trends in defense spending over time. To say that a state spends 
more in 2018 on defense than it did in 1985 says little about how much of a state’s 
available resources are being devoted to its military. States that spend a greater portion of 
their GDP on defense could do so for several reasons, ranging from an increase in 
militarization internationally to the existence of interstate conflict. States that spend less 
on defense as a proportion of their GDP may view the international environment as more 
peaceful, and therefore as a policy matter of secondary importance. Including military 
spending as a percentage of GDP allows me to identify the rank importance of military 
expenditure across a multitude of states with differing interests. Second, states with 
higher levels of globalization typically have higher GDPs, making it easier to increase 
military spending without having to sacrifice financial capital for domestic political 
needs. A state with a GDP of $1 trillion that spends 6.0% on its military amounts to $60 
billion in annual defense spending, whereas a country like the United States with a GDP 
of $20 trillion that spends 3.0% on its military amounts to a staggering $615 billion in 
annual defense spending. This difference in spending allows wealthier states more 
options for making use of the available funds, including investing in important programs 
such as research and development. For example, “the $78.1 billion the United States 
military spent on research and development in 2016 was 25 times the amount spent by 
the next highest-funder, South Korea; 33 times the amount spent by the United Kingdom; 
70 times the amount spent by France; 73 times the amount spent by Japan; and 80 times 
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the amount spent by Germany” (Sargent 2018). The need to capture military spending as 
a percentage of GDP is important for illuminating certain aspects of the international 
environment. States differ geographically, culturally, economically, politically, and 
militarily; any study that fails to consider these differences would suffer tremendously 
from erroneous conclusions about the similarities, or dissimilarities, among states of the 
international system.  
To assess further the impact of economic and informational globalization on 
military capabilities, I include several control variables. First, using the Correlates of War 
data on interstate war I control for whether a state is involved in an ongoing conflict. This 
variable appears in the data as (Ongoing War). I expect interstate war to drive expansions 
in a state’s military capabilities to make up for battlefield losses and to ensure its victory. 
Second, I include a dummy variable (Cold War), which codes 1 for any year during the 
Cold War period and 0 for any year in the post-Cold War period. Military capabilities and 
expenditures during the Cold War were dominated by the United States and the Soviet 
Union as the two hegemonic powers vied for influence throughout the world. Therefore, 
most other states during the Cold War years comprise less of the total global share of 
military power. This leads me to believe the post-Cold War period should positively 
correlate with increases in military capabilities, since the fall of the Soviet Union opened 
new pathways for states to compete for a larger share of the global military capabilities. 
Next, I control for states that are major powers by utilizing the Correlates of War dataset 
on State System Membership (Major). For a state to qualify as a major power it “must be 
a member of the League of Nations or United Nations, or have a population greater than 
500,000 and receive diplomatic missions from two major powers” (Singer 1987). I expect 
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major powers to have a greater share of the global military capabilities, for obvious 
reasons, such as their tendency to have far larger economies and greater population sizes, 
both crucial elements for building a solid foundational basis of power. Finally, for the 
variable (Defense), I use the Correlates of War dataset on Defense Cooperation 
Agreements (DCA), which is helpful for determining whether states with bilateral 
defense treaties are more likely to experience increases in military capabilities. Studies 
throughout the literature on the diffusion of military capabilities suggest that defense 
treaties increase the capabilities of states through the sharing of information and the need 
for interoperability. I expect that states with higher DCAs should also see increases in 
military capabilities. Because I also suspect that the type of governance may have a 
significant effect on the military capabilities of states, I use data from the Polity IV 
project that captures the regime type of all states in the international system for the years 
of 1970 to 2011. “The ‘Polity Score’ captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-
point scale, ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy)” 
(Marshal, Gurr, and Jaggers 2019). I label this variable as Polity) in my models. I suspect 
that autocratic governments, because of their tendency to exhibit attributes of 
praetorianism and self-preservation, should correlate positively with increases in military 
capabilities. Furthermore, because democratic states must balance their military 
ambitions against domestic political programs, i.e. the guns vs. butter argument, increases 
in democracy should correlate with a decrease in military capabilities. Lastly, I include a 
variable for GDP in Models 5 and 6 because I suspect that due to the nature of how CINC 
scores are measured, doing so will help me determine if there are problems regarding the 
significance between variables. Notably, because CINC incorporates military 
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expenditures as part of its formula and is a numerator, this may correlate highly with 
GDP scores on the opposite side of the equation in the denominator, reducing the 
significance of several other variables in the process. To capture this variable, I use 
Gleditsch (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP dataset, with the variable represented in 
models as (Log/GDP). The results of my empirical exercise are presented and discussed 
in greater detail in the following section.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 provides the estimations of my OLS models. Models 1 and 2 examine the 
CINC score as the dependent variable while models 3 and 4 examine defense spending as 
a percentage of GDP. Further, Models 5 and 6 observe the effects of CINC lagged and 
Military/GDP lagged with the additional variables Polity and Log/GDP as a test of 
robustness. Models 1, 3, 5, and 6 use current year independent variables while models 2 
and 4 lag all independent variables by one year. The findings of these analyses provide 
insightful revelations about the effects of economic and informational globalization on 
military capabilities. Contrary to the first hypothesis of this study, Models 1 and 2 
suggest that economic globalization correlates negatively with military capabilities. The 
implications of this finding are substantial for a few reasons. First, that economic 
globalization is significant and negative reveals that, as states become more economically 
globalized, they are less likely to experience increases in their military capabilities. Those 
who argue in support of the assumption that economic interdependence decreases the 
likelihood of interstate conflict appear to find validation in this belief. One explanation as 
to why states’ military capabilities may decrease because of increases in economic 
globalization may be due to changes in the international threat environment. As economic 
globalization increases within and among states internationally, they are potentially less 
inclined to view other states as threatening to their survival. Past research demonstrates 
that among the world’s democracies, fighting altogether evaporates as countries align 
politically and economically (Friedman 1999). Second, these results also lend support to 
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the guns versus butter argument whereby states choose between increasing spending for 
either defense or social programs, but cannot increase spending for both concomitantly. 
The results of my study show that as economic globalization increases the likelihood 
states will opt for greater spending on butter, rather than my predicted hypothesis that 
states would use a greater portion of this newfound wealth for increasing defense 
spending and procuring new military capabilities, bears true. 
Alternatively, Models 1 and 2 present the finding that increases in informational 
globalization correlates with increases in military capabilities. Thus, a one-point increase 
in informational globalization corresponds with a 0.015 percent increase in military 
capabilities as captured by the CINC variable. These findings are in line with my second 
hypothesis, which posits that a rise in informational globalization leads to an increase in a 
state’s military capabilities. This finding emboldens the arguments of past researchers 
who proclaim that information technology systems are altering the way states go about 
building military capabilities.
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There is a caveat to these findings: the observable increases/decreases in CINC 
scores as captured by the commensurate measures of globalization appear small due to 
the immense number of states in the international system. Because CINC scores spread 
across more than 190 countries, we should not expect considerable variations in the 
changes of CINC scores. It would be surprising if states experienced major fluctuations in 
capabilities because a substantial increase in one state’s CINC score would have to be 
offset by a substantial decrease in the capabilities of one or more states for the same 
period. Nevertheless, the relationship between informational globalization and military 
capabilities is positive and significant is a novel finding of this study. Technological 
innovations, particularly those relevant to military capabilities, do appear to serve in 
some capacity as force multipliers. That is, when states are willing to invest the time and 
resources into researching and developing advanced information technology systems, and 
more importantly, pursue policies that emphasize the critical role of these systems, they 
are likely to benefit from these capabilities. 
To further test the robustness of these relationships, Models 2 and 4 displays the 
results of the linear regressions with lagged independent variables. The findings of these 
models are for the most part consistent with those displayed in Models 1 and 3, the only 
difference being a change in significance for economic globalization when the main 
dependent variable is military spending as a percentage of GDP. These results suggest 
that the previous year’s economic and informational globalization measures affect the 
value of a state’s CINC score in the current year. However, when the main dependent 
variable reflects military spending as a percentage of GDP, only informational 
globalization attains significance. In Model 3, both economic and informational 
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globalization fail to attain statistical significance. The only variables that reach 
significance at the 0.05 level are the control variables Cold War and major power. The 
results of Models 5 and 6 display the finding that polity never achieves statistical 
significance, while Log/GDP reaffirms my previously mentioned concern that the 
relationship between CINC scores and GDP washes out the significance of other 
variables in the equation due to the methodological nature of how each is quantified. 
Because CINC scores include military expenditures as a component of national 
capabilities in the numerator, and GDP is capturing the similar measure on the right side 
of the equation in the denominator, the two variables are highly significant and work to 
undermine the relationships of other variables. 
For most of my models, the defense variable fails to attain significance, with the 
only exception being in Model 4, where it is negative. This suggests that Defense 
Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) do not influence a state’s military capabilities. While 
states may strive for interoperability with allies, the results presented here do not lend 
support to the argument that defense agreements increase a state’s military capabilities 
through information sharing. The Cold War variable is in line with my hypothesis that the 
capabilities of states decrease for years during the period that was dominated by the two 
world’s leading superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. The dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact, allowed former Soviet satellite states in Eastern 
Europe to explore new opportunities concerning their military capabilities, helping them 
increase their share of global power in the process. That the variable for major powers is 
positive and significant across all models is unsurprising. On average, major powers tend 
to represent a disproportionately large share of global military capabilities. Thus, we 
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should expect these same countries to be most attentive to their capabilities relative to 
their opponents, especially since major power war remains plausible even in an era of 
expanding globalization. The lack of interstate war between the world’s major powers 
means the rate at which their share of capabilities will grow is likely to decline in the 
future as they become more accustomed to dealing with one another on peaceful terms. 
However, going forward major powers remain likely to represent a disproportionately 
large share of military capabilities in relation to other states in the international system, 
due simply to their size and wealth. 
Limitations 
This study, like most, is not without its limitations. Perhaps the most prominent 
limitation of this study must do with the variable used to capture military capabilities 
(CINC) being a zero-sum measure. The explanatory power of my model is somewhat 
reduced since all states represent a share of the total military capabilities present in the 
international system in each year. Thus, even if every country in the system increased its 
military capabilities over a one-year period, CINC scores would only reflect increases for 
those who experienced the largest increases in capabilities in net terms. This presents us 
with the potentially misleading conclusion, that a state’s CINC score can decrease despite 
managing to increase its military capabilities. This happens when other states in the 
international system increase their own military capabilities by a factor far larger, making 
it appear that smaller states are losing power.  
A variable better suited to capture increases in military capabilities would be a 
non-zero-sum measure. This way, multiple states could experience increases in their 
capabilities without it being detrimental to those whose capabilities grow by an amount 
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less than that of major powers and larger states. The results of economic globalization 
show us that several states can and often do benefit simultaneously without necessarily 
forfeiting security in the process. 
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CONCLUSION 
The results of this study suggest that despite the rapid pace with which 
globalization has advanced in the past several decades, its effects on military capabilities 
are ambivalent. When further broken down into the subtopics of economic and 
informational globalization, the corresponding results are telling. Although states benefit 
from a rise in economic globalization, there is no evidence to suggest they are attempting 
to translate economic gains into bolstering their respective military power by investing in 
the appurtenant capabilities. Instead, as states integrate further into the global economy, 
they experience decreases in their share of global military power. The results are 
especially beneficial for those who argue that increased economic integration reduces the 
frictions between states and the likelihood of conflict in the process. Proponents of 
liberalism should feel justified in their veneration of globalization as a stabilizing force 
within international relations, as the results of this study specifically elucidates. Yet, 
many states, especially those in the West, have shifted their military priorities in previous 
years to combat the growing prevalence of extra-state violence. The rise of asymmetric 
and irregular warfare by non-state actors and the desire of states to use military 
capabilities to defend the integrity of the global commons may also play a contributing 
role in the decrease in traditional measures of capabilities, typically regarded as necessary 
for combatting interstate violence. Additionally, scholars of the international relations 
theory liberalism will be pleased to find that economic globalization appears to manifest 
itself in the findings pertaining to economic globalization.  
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However, this should not be taken to mean that the explanatory power of realism 
as a political science theory is altogether irrelevant in attempting to explain the impact of 
globalization on the nature of the international environment. Alternatively, that 
informational globalization correlates with increases in military capabilities suggests that 
realism is still very much a useful theory of political science inquiry. The increasingly 
important role of advanced information technology systems in modern militaries has been 
identified previously (Berkowitz 2003; Goldman and Eliason 2003; Boot 2006; Shimko 
2010). My research supplements the findings of these earlier studies by suggesting that 
informational globalization is a driving force behind increases in military capabilities.  
Going forward, the most militarily powerful states are likely to be those that make 
the best use of advanced information technology systems, by incorporating these systems 
into their existing force structure. The most formidable battlefield adversaries of the 
future will not be those with the largest bank accounts, but rather the most sophisticated 
tactical and strategic capabilities. This poses a substantial challenge to the United States 
military. It is highly unlikely that the United States will be able to spend its next potential 
hegemonic rival out of existence like it did with the Soviet Union. Instead, the challenge 
will be to continuously manufacture advances in pertinent information technology 
systems necessary for maintaining a competitive advantage across the board in military 
capabilities. Given this possibility, and the rate at which informational globalization 
continues to spread throughout the international system, achieving this objective will be 
an arduous task for the United States and its allies. Moreover, America’s technical 
advantage of the last decade is disappearing as other countries like China and Russia 
pursue similar technological advances (Friedburg 2012; Heginbotham et al 2015; Radin 
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et al 2019). An additional challenge will be to manage increases in capabilities without 
exacerbating geopolitical tensions by inadvertently contributing to an arms race with 
strategic competitors interested in pursuing parallel capabilities. 
Furthermore, a principal goal of future research should be to identify a systematic 
measure of capabilities that captures the most important components of military power, 
while making sure not to exaggerate the strengths of certain states in the process. 
Accomplishing this goal will be a difficult task. Fortunately, expert practitioners like 
Michael Beckley (2018) have already begun to formulate a new measure of capabilities, 
by accounting for a state’s net resources rather than its raw power potential. The 
centrality of power to international relations means formulating an appropriate measure is 
crucial for both policymakers and academics interested in examining fluctuations in the 
balance of capabilities between the world’s major and minor military powers. An 
inaccurate appraisal of military capabilities can lead researchers to fallacious conclusions 
and politicians to make faulty decisions based on lamentable information concerning 
matters of national security. A better measure of military capabilities would do much to 
ameliorate this dilemma by providing an accurate assessment of military capabilities to 
those who need it most. Whether such capabilities can be converted to meet the 
geopolitical aspirations of states remains to be seen.  
  
54 
REFERENCES 
“68% Of the World Population Projected to Live in Urban Areas by 2050, Says UN | 
UN DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs.” 2018. United Nations. 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2018-revision-of-world-
urbanization-prospects.html (September 27, 2019). 
“A Conversation with Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster.” 2014. Carnegie Council 
for Ethics in International Affairs. 
https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20141204-a-conversation-
with-lieutenant-general-h-r-mcmaster (September 27, 2019). 
Acemoglu, Daron, and Pierre Yared. 2010. "Political Limits to Globalization." The 
American Economic Review 100(2): 83-88. 
Allen, Michael A., Michael E. Flynn and Julie VanDusky-Allen. 2016. The Localized 
and Spatial Effects of US Troop Deployments on Host-State Defense Spending. 
Foreign Policy Analysis. 
Alic, John A. 2007. Trillions for Military Technology: How the Pentagon Innovates 
and Why It Costs So Much. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Arndt, Sven W. 1999. “Globalization and Economic Development”, The Journal of 
International Trade & Economic Development, 8(3): 309-318. 
Art, Robert J. 2015. “The Fungibility of Force.” in The Use of Force, edited by Robert 
J. Art & Kelly M. Greenhill, 3–19. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Arquilla, John. 2003. “Patterns of Commercial Diffusion.” in The Diffusion of Military 
Technology and Ideas, edited by Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C Eliason. Stanford 
University Press, 348-369. 
Barbieri, Katherine. 1996. "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source 
of Interstate Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research 33(1): 29-49.  
  
55 
Buzan, Barry and George Lawson. 2013. “The Global Transformation: The 
Nineteenth Century and the Making of Modern International Relations”, 
International Studies Quarterly, 57(3): 620–634. 
Beckley, Michael. 2018. "The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters." 
International Security 43(2): 7-44. 
Bell, Mark S. & Miller, Nicholas L. 2015. “Nuclear Weapons and Conflict.” in The 
Use of Force, edited by Robert J. Art & Kelly M. Greenhill, 318-332. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Berkowitz, Bruce D. 2003. The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 
21st Century. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Biddle, Stephen. 1996. "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about 
the Future of Conflict." International Security 21(2): 139-179. 
Biddle, Stephen D. 2004. Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern 
Battle. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Boot, Max. 2006. War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern 
World. New York: Gotham Books. 
Brodie, Bernard. 1976. “Technological Change, Strategic Doctrine, and Political 
Outcomes.” In Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, 263–306. 
University of Kansas Press. 
Capaccio, Tony. 2019. “F-35 Fighter Jets Will Cost $22 Billion More Than Expected, 
Pentagon Says.” Time Magazine. https://time.com/5575608/lockheed-martin-f-35-
jet-cost/ 
Copeland, Dale C. 1996. "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade 
Expectations." International Security 20(4): 5-41. 
Cordesman, Anthony H. 2014. “The Real Revolution in Military Affairs.” The Real 
Revolution in Military Affairs | Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/real-revolution-military-affairs. 
  
56 
Daudin, Guilllaume, Matthias Morys and Kevin H. O'Rourke. 2008. "Globalization, 
1870-1914," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper 
Series. 
Demchak, Chris C. 2003. “Creating the Enemy: Global Diffusion of the Information 
Technology-Based Military Model.” in The Diffusion of Military Technology and 
Ideas, Stanford University Press, 307-347. 
“Demographics of Mobile Device Ownership and Adoption in the United States.” 
2019. Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech. 
https://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ (September 29, 2019). 
Dolgopolova, Irina, Qazi Adnan Muhhamad Hye, and Iyala Tam Stewart. 2012. 
“Energy Consumption and Economic Growth: Evidence from Non-OPEC Oil 
Producing States.” Quality & Quantity 48(2): 887–898. 
“E-3 Sentry (AWACS).” 2015. U.S. Air Force. https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-
Sheets/Display/Article/104504/e-3-sentry-awacs/ (September 27, 2019). 
Frankel, Jeffrey. 2011. “Globalization of the Economy.” In International Politics: 
Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 10th ed., 305–21. Pearson. 
Taylor, Fravel M. 2019. Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Friedberg, Aaron L. 2012. A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the 
Struggle for Mastery in Asia. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 
Friedman, Thomas. 1999. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. 1st ed. New York: Farrar, 
Straus, and Giroux. 
Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" The National Interest, (16): 3-18. 
“F-15's New Advanced High-Speed Mission Computer Makes First Flight.” 2016. 
U.S. Air Force. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/849185/f-15s-
new-advanced-high-speed-mission-computer-makes-first-flight/ (September 27, 
2019). 
  
57 
Gaddis, John Lewis. 1986. "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar 
International System." International Security 10(4): 99-142. 
Galvin, Hannah. 2003. “The Impact of Defence Spending on the Economic Growth of 
Developing Countries: A Cross-Section Study”, Defence and Peace Economics, 
14(1): 51-59. 
Garamone, Jim. 2019. “DIA's China Military Power Report Details Leaders' 
Strategy.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/1732657/dias-china-
military-power-report-details-leaders-strategy/ (September 27, 2019). 
Gartzke, Erik. 2007. "The Capitalist Peace." American Journal of Political Science 
51(1): 166-191.  
Gartzke, E., & Kroenig, M. 2009. A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(2): 151–160. 
Geraghty, R. 2007. The Impact of Globalization in the Roman Empire, 200 BC-AD 
100. The Journal of Economic History, 67(4): 1036-1061. 
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. Expanded Trade and GDP Data. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 46 (5): 712-724. 
Goldman, Emily O., & Leslie C. Eliason. 2003. The Diffusion of Military Technology 
and Ideas. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Goldman, Emily O. & Andres, Richard. 1999. Systemic Effects of Military Innovation 
and Diffusion. Security Studies. (8): 79-125. 
Goure, Daniel. 2018. “Winning Future Wars: Modernization and a 21st Century 
Defense Industrial Base.” The Heritage Foundation. 
https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/topical-essays/winning-future-wars-
modernization-and-21st-century-defense (September 27, 2019). 
Gozgor, Giray, Chi Keung Marco Lau, and Zhou Lu. 2018. “Energy Consumption and 
Economic Growth: New Evidence from the OECD Countries.” Energy (153): 27–
34. 
  
58 
Gray, Colin S. 1993. Weapons Don’t Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military 
Technology. Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas. 
Gray, Colin S. 2011. Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an 
Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College. 
Heginbotham, Eric, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, 
Sheng Tao Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. 
Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris. 2015. 
The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance 
of Power, 1996–2017. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
Hiscox MJ. 2010. The Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policies. In: Ravenhill 
J Global Political Economy. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 51-83. 
Horowitz, Shale. 2004. Restarting Globalization after World War II: Structure, 
Coalitions, and the Cold War. Comparative Political Studies (37): 127-151. 
Horowitz, Michael. 2010. The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences 
for International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
“Individuals Using the Internet (% of Population).” Data. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS (September 25, 2019). 
Irandoust, Manuchehr. 2017. “Militarism and Globalization: Is There an Empirical 
Link?” Quality & Quantity 52(3): 1349–1369. 
James, Paul and Manfred B. Steger. 2014. “A Genealogy of ‘Globalization’: The 
Career of a Concept.” 
Mahnken, Thomas G., and Barry D. Watts. 1997. "What the Gulf War Can (and 
Cannot) Tell Us about the Future of Warfare." International Security 22(2): 151-
162. 
Marshal, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2019. Polity IV Project: 
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018.  
  
59 
Mathews, J. A. 2006. “Dragon multinationals: New Players in 21st Century 
Globalization”, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 19(4): 467-488. 
Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company. 
Mistree, Dinsha. 2017. States in the Developing World. Edited by Miguel A. Centeno, 
Atul Kohli, and Deborah J. Yashar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nye, Joseph S. 2011. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs. 
Nye, Joseph S. 1990. "Soft Power." Foreign Policy, (80): 153-171. 
O’Rourke, Kevin H. & Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2002. "When Did Globalisation 
Begin?" European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, 6(1): 
23-50. 
Ortiz-Ospina, Esteban, Diana Beltekian, and Max Roser. 2019. "Trade and 
Globalization". Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: 
'https://ourworldindata.org/trade-and-globalization' 
Pitts, Martin, and Miguel John Versluys. 2014. Globalisation and the Roman World: 
World History, Connectivity and Material Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Pollack, Kenneth M. 2019. Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab 
Military Effectiveness. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Posen, Barry R. 2015. “Sources of Military Doctrine.” in The Use of Force, edited by 
Robert J. Art & Kelly M. Greenhill, 28–45. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
“P-8A Poseidon.” P-8A Poseidon. https://www.military.com/equipment/p-8a-
poseidon (September 27, 2019). 
Radin, Andrew, Lynn E. Davis, Edward Geist, Eugeniu Han, Dara Massicot, Matthew 
Povlock, Clint Reach, Scott Boston, Samuel Charap, William Mackenzie, Katya 
Migacheva, Trevor Johnston, and Austin Long. 2019. The Future of the Russian 
Military: Russia's Ground Combat Capabilities and Implications for U.S.-Russia 
Competition. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
  
60 
“RC-135V/W Rivet Joint.” 2012. U.S. Air Force. https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-
Sheets/Display/Article/104608/rc-135vw-rivet-joint/ (September 27, 2019). 
Rodrik, Dani. 2018. "Populism and the Economics of Globalization." Journal of 
 International Business Policy. 1(1-2): 12-33. 
Rogers, Everett M. 2003. Diffusion of Innovations: 5th Edition. New York: Free Press. 
Roser, Max and Hannah Ritchie. 2019. "Technological Progress". Published online at 
OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: 'https://ourworldindata.org/technological-
progress. 
Russett, Bruce & O’Neal, John R. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York, NY: Norton & Co. 
Sagan, Scott Douglas, and Kenneth Neal Waltz. 2013. The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons: An Enduring Debate. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Santoro, David. 2005. "Defining Proliferation: Past and Present Perspectives." AQ: 
Australian Quarterly 77(2): 28-40. 
Santoro, David. 2006. "From Weapons Proliferation to Weapons Diffusion." AQ: 
Australian Quarterly 78(1): 16-40. 
Sargent, John F. 2018. “Government Expenditures on Defense Research and 
Development by the United States and Other OECD Countries: Fact Sheet.” 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.  
Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2017. Nuclear Weapons and Coercive 
Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shimko, Keith L. 2010. The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution. 
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. 
Singer, David J. 1987. “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material 
Capabilities of States, 1816-1985” International Interactions, (14): 115-32. 
“Sixty Years of The Military Balance.” IISS. https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-
military-balance/the-military-balance-2019/sixty-years-of-the-military-balance 
(September 27, 2019). 
  
61 
Speier, Richard H., George Nacouzi, Carrie Lee, and Richard M. Moore. 2017. 
Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of 
Weapons. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
Spence, Michael, Patricia Clarke Annez, and Robert M. Buckley. 2009. Urbanization 
and Growth: Commission on Growth and Development. Washington, DC: World 
Bank.  
Staples, Steven. 2000. "The Relationship Between Globalization and Militarism." 
Social Justice, 4(82): 18-22. 
Tang, Rachel. 2010. “China’s Steel Industry and Its Impact on the United States: 
Issues for Congress.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
“This Week in DIA History: Foundation of the ‘Soviet Military Power’ Se.” 2019. 
Defense Intelligence Agency. https://www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-
View/Article/1833995/this-week-in-dia-history-foundation-of-the-soviet-military-
power-series/ (September 27, 2019). 
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1999. "Globalization and Governance." PS: Political Science & 
Politics 32(4): 693-700. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. 2000. “Globalization and American Power.” The National 
 Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/article/globalization-and-american-power-
 1225 
Waters, Malcolm. 2001. Globalization. New York, NY: Routledge.  
World Health Organization. N.d. “Globalization.” 
 https://www.who.int/topics/globalization/en/ (September 27th, 2019).  
“World Military Expenditure Grows to $1.8 Trillion in 2018.” 2019. SIPRI. 
https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/world-military-expenditure-grows-
18-trillion-2018 (September 25, 2019). 
  
62 
Yakovlev, Pavel. 2007. “Arms Trade, Military Spending, and Economic Growth”, 
Defence and Peace Economics, (18): 317-338.  
Yoshihara, Toshi, and James R. Holmes. 2018. Red Star Over the Pacific: China's 
Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press. 
Young, Thomas-Durell. 2003. “Cooperative Diffusion through Cultural Similarity: 
The Postwar Anglo-Saxon Experience.” in The Diffusion of Military Technology 
and Ideas, edited by Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason. Stanford University 
Press, 93–113. 
